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Abstract
We present a test of the behavioral versus the rational model of advertising in the financial market. We
analyze the Granger-causality relationship existing between Comit stock market index and advertising of
financial products and services from the most important daily published financial newspaper in Italy. We
run the test for both the risky and non-risky advertising, finding that the behavioral model of advertising
is supported when risky financial products and services are considered, while the rational model is true
for the non-risky. We ascribe this result to the dual process of reasoning: When investors evaluate the
decision to buy risky financial products and services, they activate the automatic, rapid decision making
process. The behavioral model of advertising copes with it and provides an advertising strategy that
responds to market evolutions. When non-risky financial products and services are considered, a different
mental process, requiring slow and sequential reasoning, operates, compatibly with a rational decision
making process.
Keywords: advertising, stock market, dual process, financial institutions, risk
JEL-Classification: G02, G20, M37,O51
1. Introduction
Advertising is meant to convince people to make choices which favor the advertiser. But how do
advertisers choose the persuasion model that will prove successful? In the rational/traditional model of
the advertiser’s behavior (Stigler, 1961, 1987), the advertising message conveys objective information that
is useful to judge the product/service. Consumers use this information to update his/her beliefs about
∗Corresponding Author: francesca.pancotto@unimore.it. Department of Communication and Economics. Viale Allegri 9,
21414, Reggio Emilia, Italy.
the product and decide his/her buying behavior. The rational consumer should interpret in a negative
view the lack of disclosure of relevant information (Akerlof, 1970; Grossman et al., 1980).
On the opposite side, the behavioral model suggests that persuasion exerts leverage on the prevailing
beliefs of the consumers (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Prevailing beliefs can be inaccurate, but it does not
matter: ‘In the behavioral model, far from trying to convince the audience that it holds erroneous beliefs,
the persuader attempts to benefit from such beliefs’(Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). The advertising
message contains what consumers want to hear in that precise moment in time: The content can be
misleading or incomplete without fear of negative reactions from the receivers which are not supposed
to be perfectly rational, but with limited rationality, and consequently being prone to be influenced by
emotions. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) find support of the behavioral versus the rational model of
persuasion by looking at financial ads published on two popular American magazines (Business Week and
Money) during the years of the internet bubble, from 1994-2003. They study the correlation between
the content of advertising of mutual funds and the stock market index, considering this investment as
a risky financial asset that should appeal to investors in periods when beliefs are optimistic: They find
that the response of advertisers is related to the dynamics of stock returns as predicted by the behavioral
model, finding a positive correlation between the growth of the stock market and the share of mutual
funds ads promoting growth funds. More in general, (Mullainathan et al., 2008) test the behavioral versus
the rational model of persuasion in a theoretical framework, exploring in particular the case of mutual
funds advertising. They use the number and content of mutual funds advertising and find that advertising
companies provide data about returns only when the stock market grows: Returns are associated with the
idea of grabbing an opportunity, which in down markets cannot be associated with any state of mind that
leads to buying more financial products. Even companies with positive past returns, decide to exclude
this information from their advertising in negative stock market periods (Mullainathan et al., 2008).
Similarly to (Mullainathan et al., 2008; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), we propose a test of the
two competing model of advertising, the behavioral versus the traditional model. Differently from them,
we suggest that the two models are not competing but complementary at least when considering decision
making in financial markets. We believe that when faced with the decision to buy products and services
provided by financial intermediaries, investors activate the dual process accounts of reasoning (Evans,
2003; Kahneman, 2011), depending on the type of product or service that they are facing. When investors
evaluate the decision to buy risky financial products and services, they activate the automatic, rapid
decision making process, heritage of animal evolution and generating behavioral responses to decisions.
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In this case, the behavioral model of advertising is active, as suggested in (Mullainathan et al., 2008), as
advertisers are aware of the fact that this mechanism is at work when considering this type of investments.
The second process of reasoning is instead activated when non-risky financial products and services are
considered: This mental process requires slow and sequential reasoning which is compatible with a rational
decision making process.
We test our hypothesis with a set of Granger causality tests that study the timing between the
dynamics of the stock market and advertising of financial products and services, categorized as Risky
Financial products/services (RFP&S) and Non-Risky Financial products/services (NRFP&S). Data used
in this paper are the number of ads made by financial intermediaries such as Banks, Insurance Companies,
Brokers, Asset Managers on the most important Italian financial newspaper, from January 2006 to the
end of March 2015 and the Milan Comit Global Price Index.
Psychological research supports our theoretical framework suggesting complementary strategies for
the advertisement of risky and non-risky financial products/services. Studies on dual-process theories
show that people use different thinking systems to attend to information (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2003;
Kahneman, 2003). In particular, System 1 is fast, intuitive, based on associations, and does not require
much cognitive effort, whereas System 2 is slow, analytical, based on rules, and requires substantial cogni-
tive resources (in terms of attention, memory, and self-control, (Kahneman, 2003)). Research also shows
that people’s decision-making, and in particular System 1, is often influenced by feelings (Slovic et al.,
2004; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Consistent with the affect heuristic approach, feelings are quick, general
reaction that determine whether a product is good or bad and have developed to help individuals make
fast approach/avoidance decisions. Feelings are mostly processed through System 1 but can influence the
slower deliberative thinking of System 2 when people try to analyze a decision more carefully (Slovic et al.,
2004). When feelings are involved, because people are unsure about what to do and anticipate the regret
of making a mistake, their ability to process information deliberatively and analyze the situation carefully
are often reduced (Kahneman, 2011). This is exactly what should happen when people are assessing
risky financial services/products that involve the possibility of making serious mistakes or incurring in a
loss. Negative feelings enter the decision-making process and may steer it away from a particular product
(Slovic et al., 2004; Greifeneder et al., 2010). As a consequence, advertisement for these products should
counteract intuitive, affective reactions to overcome anticipated negative feelings by the investors. A way
to make these product or services more attractive and induce people to update their beliefs is by taking
advantage of a general positive sentiment of the market. During bull markets, investors tend to be a
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little more overconfident (Statman et al., 2006), although they may also under-react to recent positive
news (Barberis et al., 1998). Therefore, under these conditions, the behavioral approach should be more
effective because it can make a risky financial product more attractive by inducing positive feelings and
overcoming the last doubts that hold the investors back from purchasing them. Differently, when peo-
ple are choosing non-risky financial products/services, they are unlikely to experience intense negative
affective reactions since the risk of incurring a negative outcome is substantially lower. When a decision
is not too affectively loaded, people are able to better focus their attention and process information de-
liberatively (Kahneman, 2011). As a consequence, the advertisement does not have to counteract fear
or anticipated regret as much as provide objective information to help people understand which product
suits their needs best.
We find support for our hypothesis. We find that the stock market precedes - Granger causes - invest-
ment in RFP&S advertising, while there is no lead effect of the stock market for NRFP&S advertising. On
the contrary, the latter products appear to precede the stock market growth, suggesting that advertising
firms anticipate stock market dynamics and the wealth effect that comes from it.
Our results are coherent with the theoretical framework of Mullainathan et al. (2008) which explores
both the incentives of advertisers and investors in being rational versus behavioral. Although we cannot
control for the actual effect of this advertising directly. Similarly to Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)
we implicitly assume that advertising firms are rational and are consequently investing efficiently on the
type of advertising message that exactly matches the current preferences of the investors. The remainder
of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes the database and the methodology used and Section 3
discusses results and concludes.
2. Methodology and Results
Advertisements by banks, insurance and financial companies can be grouped in two categories. The
first, called Risky Financial Products and Services (RFP&S), includes advertising concerning investment
products (mutual funds, pension funds, index or unit linked insurance polices, corporate bonds, ETF,
certificates, covered warrants) or online trading platforms. In all these cases, the suggested investment
decision will expose the ads receiver to some risk. The second one - that we call Non-Risky Financial
Products and Services (NRFP&S) - includes all the residual advertising of financial products, such as
checking accounts, bank deposits, payment services, loans, casualty insurance polices, brand ads. Ac-
cording to these definitions, we created a database collecting the number of advertising found in financial
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Italian newspaper from January 2006 to the end of March 2015 that refer to RFP&S and NRFP&S.
We also calculated a five days moving average of the advertising data series to eliminate seasonality and
missing values due to holidays when the Newspaper is not available. We obtain 2401 observations for this
variable.1 For what concerns the stock market index, we use Milan Comit Global Price Index.
In order to verify our theory we test the following hypothesis:
HP 1. The stock market index Granger-causes RFP&S advertising.
HP 2. RFP&S advertising does not Granger-causes the stock market index.
The first two hypothesis provide a test of the behavioral model of advertising, similar to what Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer (2005) do but with the advantage of using a Granger methodology which provides
information on the timing of the relationship between the two variables rather than the simple association
provided by the analysis of correlation. Moreover, we explore a wider range of financial products and
services. With Hp. 1 we test whether the stock market dynamics influences the model of persuasion of
financial advertisers inducing them to an increase or decrease of RFP&S advertising as a result of stock
market ups and downs. Hp. 2 verifies that only one direction of causation is true.
HP 3. The stock market index does not Granger-causes NRFP&S advertising
HP 4. NRFP&S Granger-causes the stock index dynamics
Hp. 3 intends to verify whether a different type of reasoning is active in the decision process of
advertisers when NRFP&S are considered. Hp. 4 suggests that not only stock market is not preceding
the decision in NRFP&S advertising but also that advertising anticipates market dynamics, and the
wealth effect that derives from an expectation of future positive/negative market returns.
The Granger Causality test (Granger, 1980) that we implement is the Toda and Yamamoto (1995)
version which avoids the bias of invalid asymptotic critical values present when series are non-stationary
or co-integrated. The procedure requires estimating an augmented VAR irrespective of whether the time
series is integrated or co-integrated.2 To do that, it is necessary to determine the optimal lag length for
the estimated VAR, performed using standard information criteria. Provided that information criteria
tests are highly sensitive to the number of lags used in the VAR estimation, and considering that the
1We excluded from the database Sundays and Mondays because these two editions do not contain stock market quotes.
2Notwithstanding that, the procedure requires to verify whether integration is present in the time series considered in the
analysis. We verified this and found that the series are I(1). Results are available upon request to the authors.
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choice of a number of lags which is less or more than the true lag length can cause biased estimates, we
perform a battery of tests which include a number of lags from 6 to 25: The time span hypothesized
for the timing of financial advertising responds to what is custom in reality, according to information
obtained from operators of the field. Then we run a Modified Wald test for restrictions on the parameters
of the VAR(p) model.3
We find the following results:
Result 1. The stock market index anticipates the investment in RFP&S advertising. The reverse is not
true.
In Table 1, column (6) we see that the Wald test for rejecting the hypothesis that the stock market
index does not Granger cause Advertising (which is the standard hp in Granger-causality test procedure),
is significant at levels from 99% to 90% for a VAR model with lags from 10 to 22 included. Rejecting the
Hp that the index does not Granger cause ads, means that the index Granger causes the ads for RFP&S
ads, confirming Result 1.
Hp. 2 is verified in Table 1, column (3): the Wald test for rejecting the hypothesis that the ads do
not Granger-cause the index is never significant at any lag.
Result 2. NRFP&S advertising precedes the stock market dynamics. The reverse is not true.
In Table 2, column (6) we report the results of the test performed with NRFP&S ads and the index.
The results show no significant relationship emerging from this test. NRFP&S ads do not respond with
a reaction to the dynamics of the stock market index, positive or negative. In Table 2, column (3)
we observe that NRFP&S ads are strongly predictive of the stock index dynamics, provided that the
hypothesis tested is rejected at all lag lengths.
3. Discussion
The results reported in the previous section provide evidence for our theory. First, Result 1 tells us
that the behavioral model of advertising is true when RFP&S advertising is concerned. This confirms
the results of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Mullainathan et al. (2008). Advertisers anticipate a
trait of investors: When evaluating risky products and services, investors activate the behavioral model of
decision making. Whether by the use of framing, co-categorizing or other behavioral rules, investors follow
3For an extended description of the procedure we remind the reader to Toda and Yamamoto (1995).
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the mood of the market in their decision to buy risky financial products and services. Advertisers anticipate
these emotional beliefs increasing the amount of advertising in RFP&S, as suggested by Mullainathan
et al. (2008). Result 2 tells us that when NRFP&S are concerned, a different decision process is in
place. Investors behave rationally when deciding about financial products considered non-risky. This is
what the lack of connection with the stock market upswings tells us in Hp. 3. The result of the test
of Hp. 4 tells us that it is even possible to predict the dynamics of the stock index using the number
of NRFP&S. We ascribe this results to the dual system of belief, operating at the level of the investor
and anticipated by the advertising industry. In a dual system of beliefs, subject switch their decision
making process according to the type of activity they are engaged in. Advertisers are aware of this and
use it as a strategic tool to sell their products. When faced with RFP&S, investors are fast thinkers that
respond with investment strategies based on beliefs confirmation, framing and so on. On the contrary,
when NRFP&S are concerned, investors activate a slow thinking process that allow them to strategize
better and be rational. The result of Hp. 4 also suggests that we could predict the stock market using the
number of non risky ads present in financial newspapers: The explanation is that advertisers anticipate
the wealth effect that a stock market growth (or fall) can drive, increasing the number of advertising in
NRFP&S in the periods preceding this dynamics. Risky financial products and services in turn are not
specifically influenced by wealth effects, as risk aversion and in particular applied to the decision to invest
in equities, is not univocally determined by the level of wealth, but by other factors such as the level of
trust in the stock market (Guiso et al., 2008).
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Table 1: Granger Causality test between risky financial products
and services and Milan Comit index
H0: Adv. does not H0: Index does not
Granger-cause Index Granger-cause adv.
chi2 df P chi2 df P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
7.169 5 0.208 7.497 5 0.186
8.359 6 0.213 9.429 6 0.151
9.264 7 0.234 9.508 7 0.218
9.363 8 0.313 9.151 8 0.330
10.211 9 0.334 11.604 9 0.237
10.943 10 0.362 26.500 10 0.003***
11.340 11 0.415 26.810 11 0.005***
11.313 12 0.502 26.826 12 0.008***
11.641 13 0.557 27.261 13 0.011**
12.812 14 0.541 27.228 14 0.018**
13.846 15 0.537 27.416 15 0.026**
14.614 16 0.553 28.104 16 0.031**
21.023 17 0.225 29.887 17 0.027**
21.736 18 0.244 29.516 18 0.042**
23.288 19 0.225 30.595 19 0.045**
23.068 20 0.285 30.469 20 0.063*
25.018 21 0.246 30.812 21 0.077*
25.065 22 0.294 31.987 22 0.078*
25.351 23 0.332 32.023 23 0.100
24.799 24 0.417 31.943 24 0.128
Notes: Wald test for Granger Causality Test according to Toda
and Yamamoto (1995) procedure between RFP&S and Milan
Comit index. VAR estimation with 25 lags; constant and trend
included. Tests results reported for lags from 5 to 24. Sample
size n=2372. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Granger Causality test between non-risky financial products
and services and Milan Comit index
H0: Adv. does not H0: Index does not
Granger-cause Index Granger-cause adv.
chi2 df P chi2 df P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
13.818 5 0.017** 9.970 5 0.076*
15.771 6 0.015** 9.883 6 0.130
16.651 7 0.020** 10.048 7 0.186
17.635 8 0.024** 10.079 8 0.260
22.298 9 0.008*** 10.335 9 0.324
22.793 10 0.012** 10.614 10 0.388
26.750 11 0.005*** 13.134 11 0.285
26.490 12 0.009*** 13.726 12 0.319
26.564 13 0.014** 15.156 13 0.298
34.025 14 0.002*** 16.617 14 0.277
35.522 15 0.002*** 14.185 15 0.512
37.121 16 0.002*** 15.389 16 0.496
38.228 17 0.002*** 17.279 17 0.436
38.452 18 0.003*** 17.528 18 0.487
40.039 19 0.003*** 17.475 19 0.558
44.259 20 0.001*** 17.387 20 0.628
45.300 21 0.002*** 18.726 21 0.603
48.278 22 0.001*** 19.321 22 0.625
49.259 23 0.001*** 19.909 23 0.647
49.864 24 0.001*** 23.129 24 0.512
Notes: Wald test for Granger Causality Test according to Toda
and Yamamoto (1995) procedure between NRFP&S and Milan
Comit index. VAR estimation with 25 lags; constant and trend
included. Tests results reported for lags from 5 to 24. Sample
size n=2372. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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